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The impact of international financial  
integration on Mexican financial markets 
José Sidaoui 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, market liberalisation and advances in information technology have 
eliminated barriers to capital mobility and reduced financial transaction costs. These 
developments, together with a favourable market environment characterised by abundant 
liquidity, have led to an unprecedented integration of domestic financial systems worldwide.  
Mexico, as other emerging market economies, has taken advantage of this environment to 
implement structural policies and modernise regulation in order to strengthen its financial 
system. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the benefits of international integration for 
the money, bond and foreign exchange markets, which, in many ways, have been the 
flagship of international integration. Exposure to global financial competition has broadened 
the range of intermediaries and investors, leading to more transparent pricing, higher liquidity 
and lower transaction costs in the domestic markets. It has also enlarged the menu of 
investment alternatives and helped to attract more specialised and sophisticated participants. 
This has generated a virtuous cycle of increased integration, modernisation, competition and 
efficiency. 
The development of a market-oriented financial system comes, in part, from the experience 
of successive macroeconomic crises exacerbated by a closed and overregulated financial 
system. The transition to the current stage of development has required both vision and 
consistency from the financial authorities to provide domestic markets with sound 
foundations. This has required specific actions to incorporate the best international practices 
in terms of both the regulatory framework and the infrastructure to conduct operations.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I presents the development of the Mexican 
financial system in its transition from a relatively closed system to its current state. Section II 
provides some evidence for and explores some of the benefits of increased integration in 
financial markets. Section III describes the implications of financial integration for monetary 
policy and is followed by conclusions.    
I.   The institutional background 
This section briefly describes the institutional background that has shaped the Mexican 
financial system since 1970. 
At the beginning of the 1970s, Mexico was a relatively closed economy operating under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, in which foreign investment was severely curtailed and the 
financial system was overregulated. The central bank determined the interest rate levels of a 
small range of available saving instruments. On the asset side of banks, regulation imposed 
strict restrictions on lending by allocating a large share of the available deposits to specific 
activities. 
During the 1970s, the government gradually abandoned the macroeconomic stability attained 
in the previous 20 years. Since most of the government deficit was financed directly by the 
central bank, monetary expansion brought about a consequent upward pressure on inflation. 
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financial disintermediation as people began withdrawing their bank deposits, discouraged by 
negative real returns and the foreseeable devaluation of the currency. After a significant 
speculative attack against the peso, the government was forced to devalue it in September 
1976. 
The 1976 crisis was resolved due to the availability of additional government revenues 
coming from the exploitation of massive oil fields; however, almost none of the structural 
problems that induced the crisis were properly addressed. In particular, the financial system 
remained highly regulated and, therefore, vulnerable to the prevailing macroeconomic 
imbalances. There were, however, two significant changes implemented during those years 
in the financial arena: the issuance of the first government debt securities denominated in 
pesos (Cetes); and the granting of permission to banks to offer different products under the 
same legal entity. Commercial banks became “multiple banks”. Although these changes 
were positive, they had limited effects on the workings of the system since most of the other 
regulations remained unchanged. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the economy again faced a huge government deficit, 
amounting to 15% of GDP by 1982, due to falling international oil prices. At the same time, 
the Federal Reserve implemented a restrictive monetary policy. To compensate for the 
drastic reduction in oil revenues, the Mexican government resorted intensively to short-term 
external credit from international banks. However, the combination of a rapidly increasing 
debt, lower oil prices, and higher interest rates abroad made the prevailing fixed exchange 
rate regime untenable. Once more, Mexico was forced to devalue its currency.  
Macroeconomic instability followed the devaluation of 1982, led by a large fiscal deficit and 
an exchange policy that sought to achieve a competitive rate through devaluations. The 
inflation rate reached 180%. In the wake of the realisation that macroeconomic stability 
cannot be attained by imposing controls or through isolated and, most of the time, 
contradictory actions, there was an important policy shift. The new policy was based on the 
notion that effective integration with the rest of the world would provide the incentives needed 
for sustained growth. Consequently, in 1986, the government embarked on a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with the different problems it faced. Measures were taken to address the 
fiscal imbalance, the external debt was renegotiated, and to increase competitiveness, the 
economy was opened up to both merchandise and financial flows. 
The new policy included several actions to relieve financial repression. Exchange controls 
began to be gradually dismantled and compulsory direct financing from commercial banks 
began to be replaced by liquidity requirements. The new requirements took the form of 
marketable debt instruments which provided banks with an incentive to foster the 
development of the government debt market. With the expansion of the securities market, 
banks were no longer needed to directly finance the public sector. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, additional policies to further deregulate the financial sector 
were undertaken. In 1991, the government decided to re-privatise the banking system. This 
action was aimed at both modernising the industry and mending the inefficiencies brought 
about by 10 years of state ownership. Banks were allowed to freely determine deposit and 
lending rates as well, and all credit allocation directives were abolished. Perhaps one of the 
most important actions to open up the capital account was also taken: foreign residents were 
granted permission to hold positions in domestic fixed income securities and equities. 
The efforts to stabilise the economy and modernise the financial system were shadowed by 
the inability of the inflexible exchange and interest rates to respond to the massive capital 
inflows that were entering the country at the time. The lack of flexibility in key relative prices 
contributed to a rising current account deficit, an accumulation of international reserves and 
the expansion of banking credit.   
From 1990 to 1994, the central bank actively intervened in both money and foreign exchange 
markets with the purpose of keeping the exchange rate within a predetermined band. The 
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bringing down inflation from levels of 30% in 1990 to 7% in 1994. Nevertheless, this strategy 
revealed several shortcomings. For example, a portion of the considerable capital inflows 
from 1991 to 1993 were intermediated by commercial banks, allowing them to rapidly expand 
their lending to the private sector. However, neither the recently privatised commercial banks 
nor the banking supervisory agency had the expertise to adequately manage the enlarged 
risk exposure intrinsic to such a huge credit expansion. Additionally, the deposit insurance 
framework, according to which all banks’ liabilities were guaranteed, induced perverse moral 
hazard incentives which were exacerbated by inoperative regulation. 
In 1994, both the macroeconomic environment and expectations changed dramatically, as 
the Federal Reserve aggressively implemented a restrictive monetary policy and Mexico 
suffered from political instability. As a consequence, there was a reversal of short-term 
capital inflows.  
As in 1982, to avoid the impending devaluation of the peso, most of the international 
reserves were depleted through continuous interventions in the foreign exchange market. 
Additionally, in an attempt to restrain the demand for dollars that had severely stressed the 
foreign exchange market, the government placed massive amounts of tesobonos through 
operations in the primary and secondary markets.
1 However, after a series of speculative 
attacks, the peso was devalued in December 1994. As discussed in Sidaoui (2006), the 
overarching incentive structure of the Mexican financial system set the stage for the dual 
balance of payments and banking crises.  
To deal with the 1994–95 crisis, an emergency stabilisation programme to ensure the 
solvency of the economy was implemented by assembling an international financial 
assistance package that allowed the substitution of short-term tesobonos with long-term 
liabilities.
2 Once this package was obtained, the government implemented the second step of 
the stabilisation programme aimed at inducing a rapid macroeconomic adjustment, mainly by 
enlarging domestic savings and eliminating, for good, fiscal dominance by curtailing 
expenditures and broadening tax revenues.
3 
Even in the midst of the crisis, the government reasserted its commitment to market policies 
and implemented several actions to promote the modernisation of the financial sector, 
allowing both exchange and interest rates to be determined by supply and demand only, and 
undertaking a far-reaching reform to change the private pension system from a pay-as-you-
go mechanism to an individual capitalisation scheme. 
In addition to these reforms, several legal and regulatory actions were implemented to 
improve the workings of markets and promote their consolidation. Among the legal reforms, 
worth mentioning is the elimination of restrictions on foreign investment in the financial 
system, which brought fresh capital and technical expertise to the financial industry; the 
introduction of an explicit and limited deposit insurance framework, which  minimised moral 
hazard; a system of prompt corrective actions that set out immediate actions to be 
undertaken by banks and supervisors if their capital adequacy fell short of the required 
minimum; a better corporate resolution law; the improvement of creditors’ rights, and the 
creation of credit bureaus to prevent adverse selection problems. 
                                                  
1   Tesobonos were zero coupon bills denominated in US dollars but payable in Mexican pesos, placed by the 
federal government at discount rates with 28-day to one-year terms to maturity. 
2   See Sidaoui (2005) for more details on the Mexican strategy of foreign currency intervention in dealing with 
the tesobono problem. 
3   Sidaoui (2006) gives a thorough description of the adjustment programme implemented to address the 1995 
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The most important regulatory reforms were the adoption of international accounting 
standards for all financial companies, improvements in information disclosure and 
accountability, stricter capital adequacy regulation, and better corporate governance.   
Regulators also provided the derivatives markets with a sound framework. Furthermore, 
when markets required unbiased references for their workings and could not reach them by 
themselves, the central bank provided them with such references: for example, the daily 
fix-peso rate or the 28-day interbank interest rate (TIIE).  
II.   Evidence of increased integration and some of its benefits 
This section presents evidence of Mexican financial markets’ increased integration into the 
international financial system. Recent developments in Mexico’s money, bond and foreign 
exchange markets are analysed. Particular attention is given to the response of local players 
to the deeper integration of financial markets. The benefits of higher competition in each of 
these markets are also reviewed. 
Increased financial integration has been particularly evident in the foreign exchange market. 
Full adherence to a floating exchange rate regime and the absence of capital controls has 
paved the way for a peso-dollar market that has grown above expectations, in terms of both 
volume traded and number of participants. As reported in the recent editions of the BIS 
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, the 
volume of peso-dollar transactions doubled in 2004–07 and has increased more than fourfold 
since 2001 (BIS (2004, 2007)). Like other emerging market currencies in the survey, the 
increase in daily volume traded for the peso in 2004–07 was attributed almost entirely to 
transactions between intermediaries outside the country (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Offshore foreign exchange markets 




Mexican peso  28  61 
Australian dollar  60  59 
Canadian dollar  59  68 
Czech koruna  64  42 
Hong Kong dollar  19  14 
New Zealand dollar  75  88 
Polish zloty  34  68 
A transaction is classified as “offshore” when neither of the trading parties is a local financial institution. 
Source: Bank of Mexico calculations with data from the BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign 
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity and from the central banks of Australia, Canada, China, the Czech 
Republic, New Zealand and Poland. 
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Commercial banks account for most of the volume of foreign exchange transactions in the 
peso-dollar market. However, this dominance has been decreasing in favour of other 
participants, such as institutional investors (local and foreign), hedge funds, commodity 
trading advisers (CTAs), and model-based technical trading accounts (see BIS (2004, 
2007)). In 2007, foreign exchange transactions among local and foreign banks accounted for 
58% of the total volume traded locally as compared with 78% in 2004. Meanwhile, 
participation by other financial institutions, which include a large proportion of foreign 
institutions, rose from 19% in 2004 to 34% in 2007. 
Increased integration is also evident in the fixed income market, mainly in the government 
bond segment. Intermediation in the primary and secondary markets continues to be carried 
out predominantly by traditional, large deposit-taking institutions. However, subsidiaries of 
foreign institutions, which have focused more on securities trading, have gained importance 
(Graph 1). These recent and more dynamic institutions represent a welcome counterbalance.  
Higher integration with the global financial system has also led to a wider base of investors in 
the local bond and money markets. The period of low interest rates and “excess liquidity” 
from 2002 onwards brought about a sharp increase in foreign investors’ participation in these 
securities (Graph 2). In Mexico, this was especially evident in the fledgling market for peso-
denominated government nominal bonds. Driven by a need to diversify their portfolios and to 
search for higher-yield instruments, foreign investors were attracted to local markets by the 
stable macroeconomic environment and the lack of restrictions on capital flows. By February 
2008, foreign investors held peso-denominated government securities for a total of 
USD 25.2 billion (13% of total debt outstanding); 92% of these holdings were in long-term 
government bonds. 
Graph 1 
Bidders in primary auctions of government securities 












Retail banks include the three largest deposit-taking institutions (Banamex, 
Bancomer and Santander); investment banks include JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Merrill Lynch. 















Foreign flows to debt markets 









Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.   Source: Bank of Mexico. 
Evidence reveals higher levels of integration into the global financial system also by Mexican 
institutional investors. Nowadays, local pension funds (Afores) have around 9% of their 
assets invested in foreign assets (Graph 3). The stronger links to foreign markets and the 
regulatory changes to their investment regimes have provided local investors with a wider set 
of instruments and investment opportunities. 
Financial integration has also allowed foreign entities to issue peso-denominated debt and to 
take advantage of the demand for highly rated non-government peso-denominated bonds. 
Worth mentioning is the amount of euro-peso securities outstanding, which has almost 
equalled the level of non-bank Mexican corporate peso-denominated debt (Graph 4).  
Several factors have contributed to the expansion of the euro-peso market, in particular the 
ability of foreign issuers to efficiently manage their currency exposures in a liquid foreign 
exchange forward peso market. Another relevant factor has been the development of the 
government debt yield curve. By extending the maturity of bonds to 30 years since 2006, 
issuers and investors have been able to price these securities according to the reference 
rates (Graph 5). 
Graph 3 
Pension funds’ investment in equity and foreign securities 










Source: Pension Funds Supervisory Commission (Comisión 
Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro, CONSAR). 


































Feb 05 Aug 05 Feb 06 Aug 06 Feb 07 Aug 07 Feb 08


























Sources: Bank of Mexico; Bloomberg. 
Entities tapping into this market include international financial institutions, such as the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank, quasi-sovereign entities like the KfW 
banking group, and a large number of foreign financial institutions. The number of institutions 
issuing euro-peso debt has increased almost threefold in the last two years (Graph 6). 
Graph 6 









The shaded areas represent the number of issuers in each sector. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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Many of these issuers have taken advantage of the high demand for highly rated peso-
denominated debt. In some cases, this situation has presented them with arbitrage 
opportunities when they swap the peso exposure, thus resulting in lower funding costs as 
compared with issuing directly in their local currencies.
4 On the demand side, euro-peso debt 
allows local and foreign institutional investors to maintain a peso exposure and diversify the 
credit risk of their portfolios away from traditional domestic issuers, namely the federal 
government and large Mexican corporations. As previously mentioned, regulatory changes to 
the investment guidelines of local pension funds have increased the demand for these 
bonds. 
Further evidence of increased financial integration in Mexico is the ownership structure of 
financial companies. Throughout the sector, foreigners own a significant share of the 
industry. For example, in the banking system, subsidiaries of foreign institutions account for 
almost 80% of total assets (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
Share of foreign-owned bank assets  
In per cent 
In selected Latin American countries (2005)  In Mexico (2007) 






Mexico  80 
 
Source: Bank of Mexico.   
 
The financial system as a whole has benefited from this ownership structure, especially in 
terms of an efficient transfer of human and technological capital. The financial system has 
increased its exposure to innovative tools and sophisticated risk management practices, 
which has led to greater specialisation. 
According to recent analysis by the Bank of Mexico, the increase in foreign participation also 
corresponds to a period of greater competition among commercial banks when measured in 
terms of overall income, lending activity in the mortgage market and consumer credit.
5 
Greater competition and financial innovation, together with macroeconomic stability and 
improvements in regulatory and supervisory frameworks, have allowed for a gradual 
restoration of credit by commercial banks and other intermediaries. These conditions have 
increased the effectiveness of the credit transmission channel of monetary policy. 
                                                  
4   See Annex A for a detailed example of these transactions. 
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Integration has diversified the base of market participants. It has also led to the specialisation 
of intermediaries, issuers and institutional investors, giving rise to new and more 
sophisticated instruments. Markets have therefore become more competitive and more 
efficient, attracting more participants, further integrating domestic markets into the global 
financial system and generating more competition, thus creating a virtuous cycle.  
In the foreign exchange market, increased competition has led to an extension of active 
trading hours to other time zones and to a significant reduction in bid-ask spreads. As 
participation in the foreign exchange market has extended to time zones outside the United 
States, the hours in which the peso is traded more actively have shifted accordingly.
6 Data 
provided by Reuters show that the distribution of trading activity has shifted considerably, 
with the highest levels of market activity occurring when Mexico, New York and London are 
simultaneously open (Graph 7). Another very important change has been the reduction in the 
bid-ask spread for peso-dollar transactions, which has declined during the most active 
trading hours by more than 30% in the last two years.  
Graph 7 
Intraday trading activity in the foreign exchange market 
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6   A statistical test of the distribution of day trading shows that the average distribution during 2007 shifted 
relative to the average distribution prevailing in 2005. For further details, see Annex B.  350  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
The wider use of electronic trading platforms has attracted more global players and 
increased the effective trading day for the peso.
7 In this context, the Bank of Mexico recently 
presented an initiative to incorporate the peso as a member currency of CLS Bank. This 
measure will help to eliminate the settlement risk of peso-dollar transactions and develop a 
24-hour market for the Mexican peso.  
 
Table 2 
Volume in the foreign exchange market 
Daily average 
 2004  2007 
Foreign exchange global volumes
1 
Peso global volume (in millions of US dollars)  20,311  39,221 
Peso volume completely operated abroad (as a 
percentage of total)  28  61 
Foreign exchange derivatives volumes
2 
Over-the-counter markets 
Peso derivatives volume (in millions of US dollars)  9,978  28,981 
Peso derivatives volume completely operated abroad 
(as a percentage of total)  55 63 
1.  Volume in outright forwards (in millions of US dollars) 1,716  4,594 
  operated abroad (as a percentage of total)  39  91 
2.  Volume in foreign exchange swaps (in millions of 
US dollars) 
7,171 19,958 
  operated abroad (as a percentage of total)  56  49 
3.  Volume in options (in millions of US dollars)  708  4,185 
  operated abroad (as a percentage of total)  67  97 
4.  Volume in other derivatives (in millions of US dollars) 383  244 
  operated abroad (as a percentage of total)  95  95 
Exchange markets 
Daily average volume in Mexder (in millions of 
US dollars)  104 101 
Daily average volume in the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (in millions of US dollars)  399  546 
1  Includes spot transactions, forwards and foreign exchange swaps.    
2  Includes forwards, foreign exchange 
swaps, options, currency swaps and other derivatives. 
Sources: BIS, Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity; Bank of 
Mexico; Mexder. 
                                                  
7   Data from the 2007 Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity show 
that 75% of volume in the peso-dollar market goes through electronic platforms and the rest via intra-dealer 
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Non-commercial players have become more interested in the liquidity and depth of markets 
for swap and forward transactions referenced to the Mexican peso (both over-the-counter 
and standardised markets). Technically driven strategies depend heavily on their executor’s 
ability to open and close positions promptly at low transaction costs, and the Mexican peso 
has been particularly appealing for such purposes. According to a recent study, funds that 
base their decisions on technical models (mainly CTAs) represent approximately 45% of the 
Mexican peso volume generated on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In contrast, purely 
fundamental decisions are taken by only 10% of these funds. Hybrid models that incorporate 
technical and macroeconomic indicators make up for the rest of the volume generated.
8 
Other instruments, particularly options, are mostly booked in offshore centres with local 
intermediaries acting as third parties between investors and foreign banks (mostly parent 
banks) that take on risk. This arrangement is the result of efficiency gains obtained by 
consolidating global risks in one book and having technical expertise in managing global 
portfolios usually located at banks’ headquarters (Table 2).  
Global integration has also contributed to the expansion of execution vehicles. In the local 
foreign exchange market, the emergence of prime brokerage has allowed commercial and 
investment banks to provide credit lines, facilitating the entry of international funds to the 
dollar-peso market. 
Increased competition in the securities market has also had a positive impact by reducing 
debt trading transaction costs. This benefit is evident in the compression of assigned bids in 
primary auctions of government securities. Bid-offer spreads for bonds in the secondary 
market have fallen significantly and are currently between 1 and 2 basis points for the most 
relevant reference points on the curve (Graph 8). Lower transaction costs facilitate the price 
discovery process and the reduction of the government’s cost of funding.  
Graph 8 
Transaction costs in government debt markets 








Source: Bank of Mexico.  Source: Remate Electrónico. 
Foreign holders of peso-denominated debt have been key players in the development of the 
secondary market. In the early stages of development of the government yield curve, foreign 
investors were particularly interested in long-term bonds (Graph 9). Their holdings of these 
bonds (bonos) were relatively stable even in times of market stress, especially compared to 
the demand from local institutional players. Graph 9 shows the divergent behaviour between 
Afores and foreign investors during the first half of 2006. 
                                                  
8   Anderson (2003). 
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Source: Bank of Mexico.   
Competition from foreign investors has been an important factor influencing the change in 
investment strategies of local pension funds. The opportunity cost to Afores of holding short-
term portfolios and following short-term strategies became patent when compared to the 
investment strategies followed by foreign players. Since the second half of 2006, Afores have 
focused more on long-term investment strategies and adopted investment benchmarks. 
Consequently, the duration and diversification of their portfolios as well as their resilience to 
short-term market volatility have increased considerably, thus representing a positive 
externality of increased financial integration with the Mexican bond market. 
The emergence of investors and issuers with different needs and risk profiles has also 
increased the demand for hedging vehicles. As a result, interest rate derivative products 
have developed rapidly (Graph 10). The growth of a local interest rate swap market 
confirmed that the innovation process was under way. Virtually non-existent in the late 
1990s, exposure to Mexican interest rates is now possible with liquid swaps up to 10 years, 
and transactions up to 30 years becoming more common. Many foreign participants favour 
this market over the cash market because of its high liquidity and flexibility. The swap 
market, known as the TIIE market, is also actively used to express relative value views and 
exploit apparent inconsistencies or arbitrages among markets. Various types of risks can 
now be hedged at Mexder, the local futures exchange. TIIE contracts with maturities up to 
10  years are among the futures contracts with the highest global trading volume. 
Government bond contracts and other instruments have also gained relevance.  
Graph 10 









Source: Bloomberg.   Source: Mexder. 
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The growing presence of international players has increased the demand for innovative 
instruments. An example is the federal government’s management of liabilities through the 
use of debt exchange warrants and swaps.
9 
III.   Implications of financial integration for monetary policy 
After the 1994 devaluation of the peso, monetary policy became the nominal anchor of the 
economy. Since then, the central bank has committed to steer monetary policy towards an 
inflation objective. In the years following the crisis, the inflation objective was referred to the 
prevailing year-end annual percentage change of the consumer price index (CPI). In 2000, 
the central bank started publishing quarterly inflation reports and introduced the core 
component of the CPI to identify the trend for inflation. The transition towards an inflation 
targeting framework was completed in 2002 with the specification of a long-term inflation 
target of 3% for annual CPI inflation, with a variability interval of +/–1 percentage points.  
As a result of adopting the inflation targeting framework, monetary policy implementation has 
become more transparent, open to public scrutiny, and easier to understand and anticipate 
for market participants (Graph 11). Since 2003, monetary policy announcements have been 
made public at predetermined dates, together with a press release. This has improved the 
Bank of Mexico’s accountability and helped anchor inflation expectations, thereby reinforcing 
the transmission channel of monetary policy.  
Graph 11 














Source: Bank of Mexico. 
                                                  
9   For further details, see Annex C.   
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To some extent, the integration with global markets and the presence of foreign investors in 
the domestic market have facilitated improvements in both the implementation and 
communication of monetary policy. Indeed, the transition to an inflation targeting framework 
took place very smoothly as foreigners regarded it as the best practice in developed markets, 
which, in turn, helped to explain it to domestic market participants; ie foreigners provided a 
positive demonstration effect on domestic investors. The presence of foreign investors has 
also improved research and central bank watching.  
Financial integration has contributed to the development of deeper and more liquid capital 
markets. The central bank has therefore been able to execute monetary policy without 
having undesirable effects on the functioning of markets. In conducting its operations, the 
Bank of Mexico has tried to rely mostly on marketable instruments, further promoting market 
development.  
An example of the aforementioned is illustrated during the period from January 2000 to 
December 2006, when the central bank decided to accumulate a considerable amount of 
international reserves (USD 42 billion). Such an accumulation implied an expansion of 
liquidity of a large magnitude in the financial system. The Bank of Mexico was forced to 
increase its peso-denominated liabilities in order to sterilise the excess liquidity. More than 
half of the sterilisation was carried out via the placement of debt securities in the open 
market. During that period, the central bank issued debt instruments that float daily with the 
overnight rate and pay coupons every 28 days. These instruments are fully marketable and 
relatively liquid in secondary markets. The central bank relied only on compulsory deposits 
whenever the forecasted liquidity expansion was likely to outrun the steady sterilisation 
coming from the placement of debt securities. Compulsory deposits are remunerated at the 
overnight funding rate (Graph 12).  
Graph 12 









Source: Bank of Mexico.  
Another important element in conducting monetary policy is the possibility to extract 
information from financial markets. Today, domestic markets are a good indicator of 
expectations regarding future policy actions and these can be tracked down continuously 
through prices for interest rate futures and swaps. The foreign exchange options market 
allows the central bank to monitor expectations regarding potential movements in the value 
of the peso.
10 
                                                  
10   Exchange rate dynamics used to be very important for policy formulation given the high pass-through of 
exchange rate depreciation to inflation. However, this pass-through has declined significantly due partly to the 
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After more than a decade of consistent efforts, Mexico has consolidated a stable 
macroeconomic environment and established a new regulatory framework – which includes 
the adoption of best practices – for financial markets. These, together with a commitment to 
free and flexible markets, have allowed the economy to take advantage of the opportunities 
of global integration.  
Financial integration, mainly reflected in increased competition in domestic markets, has 
contributed to a more developed and sounder local financial system. Exposure to global 
capital markets has increased competition as well as the number of intermediaries and 
investors, leading to more transparent pricing and lower transaction costs. As shown in 
Section II, foreign players’ involvement in local markets has changed trading patterns by 
promoting the use of more sophisticated instruments, thus contributing to the adoption of the 
best international market practices.  
The use of more complex instruments, such as derivatives, has led to more efficient risk 
management by banks and other private entities. Arbitrage opportunities have increased, 
resulting in more efficient market pricing. 
Establishing and updating an appropriate regulatory framework has therefore become 
necessary. Financial authorities have been active in adapting legal and regulatory policies to 
the rapid developments in local markets. 
A sound financial market has benefited the Mexican economy by allowing both individuals 
and institutions to gain access to more favourable terms of financing. The liquid and deep 
local financial markets have shielded the economy during the recent periods of market 
turbulence. Throughout these episodes, local markets have remained remarkably resilient to 
external shocks. 
Financial integration has also driven forward the adoption of actions aimed at improving 
understanding of monetary policy decisions. These developments, together with deepening 
credit markets, have strengthened the expectations and credit transmission channels of 
monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, exposure to global markets has also shed light on some shortcomings in the 
money and bond markets: 
•  The process for determining the interbank reference interest rate. Since this rate is a 
reference for a large proportion of commercial bank assets and commercial banks 
also participate in its fixing, there is an incentive to quote high levels. The same may 
happen with futures contracts and interest rate swaps. In order to minimise 
manipulation, the central bank has constantly revised and strengthened the fixing 
procedure.  
•  Underdeveloped securities lending and long-term repo markets. Even though open 
and standard regulation has been in place since 2004, only a very small number of 
operations are carried out. Financial authorities continue to revise all regulations on 
a permanent basis to provide the missing building blocks for these markets to 
function efficiently.  
•  Fiscal distortions. The fiscal regime for foreign investors has been adapted to 
encourage their participation in financial markets. Often, the withholding tax regime 
on interest rate income needs to be updated. 
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and Ramos-Francia (2008)). 356  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
•  Absence of credit derivatives for peso-denominated securities. Regulation needs to 
be improved to allow local institutional investors to access this type of instrument. 
Currently, only interbank operations are permitted. As a result, the market has not 
developed. 
The aforementioned deficiencies bring to the fore the need to constantly improve upon the 
workings of local markets.  
In sum, financial integration has given access to world capital markets to more people, 
providing for a better allocation of savings and investment as well as more and sophisticated 
instruments to better manage risks. At the same time, however, it has also brought new 
global challenges. Mexico must be prepared to face them by acting in two dimensions: on the 
internal side, by strengthening its macroeconomic fundamentals and continually revising its 
legal and regulatory frameworks; and, on the external side, by adopting a more active role 
within the global community of central banks, regulators and other authorities to improve the 




Example of funding through a euro-peso issue 
Recent debt issuance by Morgan Stanley of a 
fixed coupon 20-year maturity bond for a 
nominal amount of MXN 350 million 
The issue date was 12 September 2007 and the yield was 8.48% per annum (67 basis points 
above the yield of the corresponding federal government bond). If Morgan Stanley were to 
have swapped the coupons from fixed to floating (TIIE) and then carried out a cross-currency 
swap from TIIE to Libor, the corresponding US dollar funding rate would be in Libor minus 
44 basis points, a rate significantly lower than the interest rate at which Morgan Stanley can 
borrow directly in US dollars.
11 
 
According to market sources, Morgan Stanley’s US dollar funding rate at the time was approximately 
100 basis points higher than Libor. 
Source: Bloomberg.  
                                                  
11   Another way to assess the advantage cost for Morgan Stanley is to compute the US dollar implied yield if all 
the bond’s cash flows were to have been swapped back into US dollars. The implied US dollar yield to 
maturity, using market prices of forward peso-dollar exchange rates, would be 5.41% per annum, 112 basis 
points lower than the yield to maturity of a bond issued by Morgan Stanley in US dollars maturing on 
June 2027. 
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Statistical analysis to test the shift in the 
distribution of trading hours in the peso-dollar market 
A series of statistical tests were conducted using the average distribution of daily trading for 
two different periods. The first period includes data for the whole of 2004 while the second 
includes data from January 2007 to date. Distributions are referred to as F2004  and  F2007, 
respectively (Graph B1). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used as follows:  
{} ) ( ) ( max 2004 2007 x F x F KS − =  
where x denotes a specific minute during the day.  
The tests performed were as follows: 
a) Ho: F2004 = F2007 vs H1: F2004<> F2007 
The null hypothesis is rejected with a confidence of 95%. 
The p-value of the KS statistic is 0.18%. 
b) Ho: F2004 >= F2007 vs H1: F2004< F2007 
The null hypothesis is rejected with a confidence of 95%. 
The p-value of the KS statistic is 0.09%. 
c) Ho: F2004 <= F2007 vs H1: F2004> F2007 
The null hypothesis is not rejected with a confidence of 95%. 
The p-value of the KS statistic is 99.96%. 
The results suggest that the distribution of 2007 has shifted to the left relative to the one 
prevailing in 2004. This means that the peso-dollar market is more liquid earlier in the day, a 
condition that could be attributed to foreign participants. 












Source: Bank of Mexico. 
 
Cumulative distribution functions of trading in the US dollar-Mexican peso 
market  












11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00




Federal government debt management operations 
A. Debt  exchange  warrants 
Under the terms of a transaction, a warrant is exercised if the yield spread between the debt 
in pesos and that in foreign currency decreases (Graph C1, left-hand panel). For investors, 
this “insurance” is appealing because they can sell UMS bonds (foreign currency 
denominated bonds) and purchase fixed rate peso bonds under favourable conditions. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance carries out large transactions to substitute foreign for 
local debt without adversely affecting the bond market. From November 2005 to October 
2007 the federal government exchanged debt under this mechanism for a total of 
USD 4.4 billion. 
B. Local  debt  swaps 
A second example of the use of innovative instruments is the swapping of government bonds 
to smooth their maturity schedules (Graph C1, right-hand panel). This type of procedure has 
reduced the settlement of very large amounts of securities at similar dates, without 
diminishing the liquidity and depth obtained by maintaining large amounts in circulation for 
most of the bonds’ life. From September 2005 to July 2007 the government carried out 
10 swap operations for a total of MXN 35.5 billion. 
Graph C1 










As of 9 November 2006. Colours in the left-hand panel show the eligible bonds to be swapped by warrant holders; 
for example, UMS with maturities between zero and five years could be swapped for the bond maturing in 
December 2011. This graph corresponds to the 2005 warrant.  
Sources: Bank of Mexico; Ministry of Finance (Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Público, SHCP). 
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C.  Federal government-Bank of Mexico swap (Graph C2) 
In 2006, the Ministry of Finance announced the prepayment of USD 12.4 billion of external 
debt. To finance the transaction, the Ministry issued domestic securities (Bondes D), with the 
same characteristics as BREMs.
12 Such sales were then used to purchase international 
reserves from the Bank of Mexico, which, in turn, used those Mexican pesos to buy back 
BREMs from the local bond market. All transactions were done through open auctions with 
previously disclosed and explained rules. 
Graph C2 












                                                  
12   BREMs were adjustable coupon notes issued and placed by the Bank of Mexico from 2000 to 2006 to sterilise 
the excess liquidity in the money market originated by the accumulation of international reserves. BREMs 
maturity terms were one, three and five years. Their coupon was referred to the daily overnight interest rate, 
payable every 28 days. 
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